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The DAC6 directive was introduced by the EU in the year 2018 with a policy objective
to increase the effectiveness in tackling cross-border tax avoidance and evasion. Dual
citizenship is one of the methods of achieving dual tax residency and therefore, this thesis
tries to verify whether dual citizenship can also be one of the methods of regulatory
arbitrage in circumventing the DAC6 directive and reduce the probability of detection and
repatriation of offshore deposits. An empirical framework is built to study the movement
of cross-border deposits before and after the initiation of the DAC6 guidelines for a
period of 19 quarters staring from Q1 2016 to Q3 2020. The analysis is done by verifying
the cross-border deposits of countries offering dual citizenship against those countries
not offering dual citizenship. Also, the countries are further classified as EU countries
and non-EU countries and the study also tries to verify the changes in the cross-border
deposits of these groups before and after DAC6. The results show that residents and
resident companies of countries having dual citizenship in general have more deposits
when compared to countries not offering dual citizenship. The results also show that the
increase of deposits in tax havens post-DAC6 is much more from the countries offering
dual citizenship than from countries not offering dual citizenship. The study finds that the
deposits of residents and resident companies across the European Union have increased
considerably post the DAC6 indicating that a stricter reporting structure is possibly
having an effect. However, the study also finds that EU deposit locations are becoming
less lucrative for residents and resident companies of non-EU countries offering dual
citizenship post-DAC6 indicating the use of dual citizenship as a method of regulatory
arbitrage against DAC6. Moreover, an analysis is also done for the countries offering
Citizenship by Investment(CBI) schemes and the findings indicate that people might also
be pro-actively pursuing these schemes post DAC6, indicating that such schemes could
also be used as methods of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6.
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1 Introduction
Regulatory arbitrage has been defined in literature as the ability of actors to circumvent
or neutralise rules by restructuring or re-characterising transactions by relocating either
the transactions or themselves (Marjosola, 2021). Therefore, regulatory arbitrage can
be described as a very generic term referring to any transaction used to circumvent the
law. Regulatory arbitrage can be seen as a phenomenon associated with tax evasion or
avoidance extensively in modern times. Aggressive tax planning activities by various actors
in society have been a cause of concern for governments and tax authorities worldwide.
Some studies in the past have pegged the loss in corporate tax revenue to governments
to be to the tune of $500-$600 billion due to tax havens (Crivelli et al., 2015; Cobham
and Jansky, 2018). Another study by Alstadsæter et al. (2018) estimates the wealth
stashed away by foreign individuals only in Switzerland to be $2.3 trillion, indicating that
the combined wealth stashed away in all the tax havens might be much more. Forbes
magazine has reported that the number of billionaires in the world increased by 31.5%
in 2021 (Dolan, 2021). With such an exponential rise in the number of high net-worth
individuals, it would not be difficult to imagine the demand for aggressive tax planning
mechanisms.
The Directive on Administrative Cooperation(DAC6) was introduced by the European
Union(hereafter referred as EU) as a countermeasure to aggressive tax planning activities
by individuals and corporations through the help of intermediaries. Under this new
directive, the definition of an intermediary encompasses any person or entity who makes a
cross-border arrangement possible by organising, marketing, designing, implementing or
managing to implement the cross-border arrangement. However, the scope of reporting
under the DAC6 is limited to reporting the cross-border arrangements of only EU taxpayers
to their respective tax authorities.(Council of the European Union, 2018) If an individual
has dual citizenship, she enjoys a taxpayer status in both countries of citizenship. This dual
citizenship status makes it very tricky for countries to track the cross-border arrangements
made by her from the other country. This has much relevance for the EU as it has to be
noted that the EU comprises only 27 countries. As per research conducted for this study,
24 of these countries allow their citizens to hold dual citizenship, albeit some allow dual
citizenship only under certain conditions(details of dual citizenship countries provided in
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the appendix).
This study, therefore, tries to empirically test the effects of dual citizenship on DAC6
through the following research question:
1. Can dual citizenship be an effective method of regulatory arbitrage against
DAC6?
The fore-mentioned question is the main focus of the study. However, the study also
examines two other research questions additionally. The examination of the following two
questions adds more significance and a logical paradigm to the study.
2. Does DAC6 help in the effective reporting of cross-border arrangements of
EU country residents?
3. Are citizenship by investment programs used as effective methods of
regulatory arbitrage against DAC6?
The importance of question 2 is that for the effect of dual citizenship as an effective method
of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6 to be correlated with significance, the study will
have to verify if DAC6 effectively achieved its desired motive of more substantial reporting
of cross-border arrangements. Question 3 tries to prove the same effect as question 1 with
a change in the treatment and control groups. Citizenship by investment(hereafter called
CBI) programs are specially designed programs by countries to attract investments from
high net-worth investors and are viewed as programs to promote aggressive tax planning
(Christians, 2017; Langenmayr and Zyska, 2021). However, CBI programs are more
lucrative to only citizens of countries that allow dual citizenship as they can obtain the
citizenship of the CBI country without relinquishing their existing citizenship. Therefore,
CBI countries are a subset of countries that offer dual citizenship.
In section 2 of the thesis, the literature review and the theoretical example crucial in
driving the study are presented. In section 3, the data description of the cross-border
deposits and dual citizenship is given. Section 4 will describe the research methodology
along with the various regression models. In section 5, the descriptive and empirical
results are presented and analysed. In section 6, the study’s limitations and the case of
Norway, which is the latest country to introduce dual citizenship, are discussed. In section
7, the thesis concludes.
3
2 Theory & Literature Review
The study of tax evasion has been a complex phenomenon. Franzoni (1999) stated that
the taxpayer’s idea of tax compliance is influenced by many factors such as the perceived
fairness of the taxes, prevailing social norms, and the chances of non-compliance being
detected or punished. Slemrod (2007) puts forward a very compelling argument as to why
governments introducing tax systems cannot wholly rely on their taxpayers’ sense of duty
to comply. The study says that initially thought a few taxpayers might comply, over some
time, even the few who pay will stop paying due to a majority of taxpayers avoiding the
taxes. The study also says that non-payment of taxes should be countered with penalties.
As per Franzoni (1999), tax evasion occurs when individuals deliberately fail to comply
with the general tax obligations resulting in a loss of tax revenue. Since taxes are the
primary source for the functioning of the state, this causes a void in the state exchequer,
paralysing the activities of the state. Tax avoidance is a related concept but essentially
differs from tax evasion. Franzoni (1999) defines it as the phenomenon when individuals
reduce their tax liability unintended and legally. The ethical boundaries of transactions
leading to tax avoidance are still questionable, and studies in the past such as McBarnet
(1992); Cowell (1992) say that the difference between tax evasion and avoidance is hardly
distinguishable at times. However, the commonality between tax evasion and avoidance
is that both are aggressive tax planning activities. In this study, though the difference
between tax evasion and avoidance is recognised, we briefly discuss the idea of aggressive
tax planning only through tax evasion. It has to be noted that from now on, tax evasion
and avoidance will be used interchangeably for convenience and the term wherever used
represents the case of aggressive tax planning.
Tax evasion has always been an issue of concern for countries around the world. The
history of tax evasion is not new. Webber and Wildawsky (1986), in their book ’A history
of taxation and expenditure in the Western world, give us an example of tax evasion as
early as the third century AD when Romans hid their jewellery and gold coins by burying
them in the ground. Tax evasion has become more evident during the second wave of
globalisation, followed after the second world war (Vanham, 2019). As a result of the
large-scale technological development and globalisation, it has become more accessible
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for people and corporations worldwide to invest in offshore locations (Casi et al., 2019).
With the options of investing abroad increasing, cross-border tax evasion has become a
significant concern for countries. A 2008 US senate report pegs the amount of tax lost
every year due to this kind of tax evasion at $100 billion annually (Casi et al., 2019).
Individuals and companies can perform tax evasion on the income earned within a country
or from income made from investments outside a country’s borders. The deposits that
individuals hold outside a country’s borders are referred to as offshore deposits and are
products of cross-border arrangements. Though the theory and logic of tax evasion apply
without any geographic bounds, the idea of this study is to essentially study the effects on
the offshore deposits held by individuals and companies abroad and therefore; we discuss
tax evasion only from that perspective. The history of the offshore finance industry can
be dated back to 1815, in the Vienna Congress, which established Switzerland’s neutrality
(Hodges, 2013). Though there are also some other claims that offshore banking originated
in the Channel Islands of France (Palan, 2009), there is no literature to back up the claim.
In one of the studies by Farquet (2012), the findings suggest that significant activity in
offshore banking started post-world war I and was the golden age of opportunity for tax
avoidance through offshore channels.
2.1 The CRS & AEOI
Governments and tax authorities around the world have always been apprehensive of these
offshore deposits. The countries that offer special incentives in tax benefits to attract
such offshore deposits have been labelled as tax havens (Dharmapala and Hines Jr., 2009).
Tax havens were not just labelled as such just for attracting the offshore deposits but
also because they provide secrecy to the deposits enabling the investor to hide these
investments from her home country (Fitzgibbon and Hallman, 2020). The G-7 summit
in 1996 had taken the first measures to counter the effect of tax havens on a collective
level, where the concerned countries asked OECD to establish standards to counter the
harmful tax competition (Sullivan, 2007). In 1998, the OECD announced a list of 35
nations considered to be pursuing such destructive tax competition methods to attract
foreign investments into the country (Sullivan, 2007).
To ensure greater disclosure of tax information and counter tax evasion, countries have
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signed exchange of information treaties between national tax authorities (Keen and
Ligthart, 2006). Countries in the past used to rely on bilateral instruments for exchanging
tax information extensively. The primary mechanism that governments are now banking
upon for tax information disclosure is the automatic exchange of information (hereafter
AEOI). AEOI provides for the automatic exchange of information on financial accounts held
by non-resident individuals and entities in a pre-defined format between tax authorities.
The information exchanged includes details about the financial account (e.g. the financial
institution maintaining it, the account number and the account balance, etc.) and details
about the account holder (e.g. their name, address, date of birth and taxpayer identification
number, etc.) (OECD, 2021a). Countries also take up other types of instruments such as
Double Taxation Agreements(DTAs) and Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs)
(Meinzer, 2009) from time to time to have greater disclosure of information. Countries
felt the importance of countering tax havens through AEOI much more post the 2008
financial crisis (Shaxson, 2015). The first piece of legislation that kept the ball of AEOI
rolling was the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act(FATCA) (De Simone et al., 2019)
which the USA adopted in the year 2010. The emphasis on AEOI was increased further
when the OECD introduced the Common Reporting Standard(hereafter CRS) in 2014
(Gadzo and Klemencic, 2017).
Before the AEOI was implemented, through CRS and FATCA, tax information exchange
mainly was done through TIEAs. A TIEA between two countries ensured tax information
exchange between tax authorities of different countries, albeit only on request. TIEAs
did not allow for the automatic exchange of tax information(Government of the Virgin
Islands, 2021). However, CRS and FATCA were introduced to ensure that the exchange
of tax information happened automatically. The primary purpose of the CRS was to
establish the tax residency of the individual or firm. Under CRS, financial institutions are
required to identify customers(individuals and controlling persons in passive non-financial
entities(NFE)) who are tax resident outside the country of operation of the financial
institute and report certain information on the financial accounts of such customers to the
local tax authorities. The local tax authorities, in return, exchange the information with
the tax authorities of the country in which the customer is a tax resident (Noked, 2018).
Though CRS is a powerful instrument of AEOI against tax evasion, it still has a few
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drawbacks. The most important of these is that the customer himself provides the
information obtained by the financial institution through self-certification (Avi-Yonah and
Mazzoni, 2018). Suppose the customer can conceal his tax residency from the financial
institution while self-certifying; it is challenging for the financial institution to identify the
tax residency of the customer correctly. Another major disadvantage of CRS is that CRS
is not a law but rather a reporting standard. The OECD model for AEOI also came with a
Competent Authority Agreement(hereafter called CAA) that enabled the implementation
of the CRS system into the national law of a country (Casi et al., 2019). Therefore,
countries planning to participate in the CRS must sign the CAA and then implement
the CAA into their law. But there are three different CAA models that a country can
choose between, and this adds to the problem while implementation of CRS on a global
level (Casi et al., 2019). With no deadline set by OECD for implementation of CRS in
the national law, many countries have not yet come under AEOI. As per OECD (2020),
approximately only half the countries and territories have started sharing information
under AEOI by 2020. Moreover, it has to be noted that the biggest economy in the world,
the USA, has not signed the CAA and is not part of CRS (Noked, 2018; Casi et al., 2019).
A final disadvantage of CRS is that OECD does not clearly define the penalty for violation
of CRS, and the penalties are decided mainly by the countries themselves (Casi et al.,
2019).
Despite the discussed drawbacks of CRS, one study reveals that CRS has been considerably
successful in the repatriation of offshore deposits held in tax havens (Casi et al., 2020b).
Since the implementation of CRS by the OECD, 105 countries have participated in the
AEOI by 2020. By the end of 2023, a total of 115 countries have agreed to start exchanging
information under the CRS (OECD, 2020). The OECD forum has also come forward
with a Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules for CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque
Offshore Structures approved by the OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs in 2018. However,
it has to be observed that CRS is still in a very nascent phase, and tax evaders are finding
new ways to circumvent AEOI and CRS (Johanessen and Zucman, 2014; Menkhoff and
Miethe, 2019). One such method of evading AEOI is by obtaining dual citizenship (OECD,
2018).
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With increasing immigration worldwide, countries are increasingly allowing their citizens
to acquire the citizenship of other countries without losing their existing citizenship (Vink
et al., 2019). There have been requests and demands from the diaspora of different nations
who have immigrated to introduce dual citizenship by their home countries (Reshma,
2017). In the recent past, we have seen a significant number of countries introducing dual
citizenship, such as Colombia (1991), Finland (2003), Australia (2002), Kenya (2010),
and, most recently, Norway(2020) (Vink et al., 2019). The history of conflicts due to
citizenship date back to the war of 1812 between the USA and the UK (Spiro, 2010). The
study by Spiro (2010) says that though dual citizenship was not allowed in most parts of
the world till world war 2, the concept started to become more acceptable after that.
Dual citizenship was a problem for most nations because it clashed with the idea of
sovereignty. Torpey (1999) says that the power of states was correlated mainly with the
control of resources, both physical and human. Therefore, the concept of dual citizenship
clashed with the idea of control over the human resources of a country. Moreover, it
also challenged the notion of loyalty to a state. Spiro (2010) also says that states were
free to treat their citizens as they pleased but had to maintain restrain when treating
nationals of other countries. The concept of dual citizenship violated the ground rules
leading to complete discretion of sovereigns in their realm. However, in time, the idea of
the sovereignty of a country changed and did not allow states complete discretion in the
treatment of nationals. This change in the behaviour of society as such can be construed
as the main reason for the increasing acceptance of dual citizenship.(Spiro, 2010)
The human rights of citizens and its conflict with sovereignty is a sociological and political
subject and does not fall under the purview of this study. This study focuses more on the
tax sovereignty of nations and the concept of dual citizenship as a tool to violate the tax
sovereignty of nations. Aggressive tax planning by individuals or corporations leads to
an erosion in the country’s tax base, thereby causing a problem to the tax sovereignty of
nations. DAC 6 was construed by the EU to protect the tax sovereignty of its member
states.
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2.3 Directive on Administrative Cooperation(DAC6)
The history of administrative cooperation in direct taxation in Europe leads back to
Directive 76/308/EEC, which was drafted on 15 March 1976 under the former European
Economic Community(EEC) (Casi et al., 2020a). Directive 77/799/EEC introduced the
detailed rules for implementing information exchange provisions upon request by EU
member states (European Commission, 2021). In 2011, the first draft of the Directive on
Administrative Cooperation(DAC1) was introduced vide directive 2011/16/EU, which
replaced the erstwhile directive introduced by the EEC in 1977 (European Commission,
2021). AEOI of financial accounts was introduced in 2014 when council directive
2014/107/EU modified the Directive on Administrative Cooperation, and DAC2 came into
force. A timeline of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (European Commission,
2021) is given in Table 2.1.
The EU modified the Directive on Administrative Cooperation on 25 May 2018, paving the
way for DAC6 vide council directive 2018/822/EU. The DAC6 directive was introduced
with a policy objective to increase the effectiveness of tax authorities in tackling cross-
border tax avoidance and evasion. This is done by providing member states’ tax authorities
with details of all cross-border arrangements of taxpayers of EU member states that are
characteristic of aggressive tax planning and indicating a possibility of tax evasion or
avoidance. An arrangement can be classified as a cross-border arrangement if it meets
any of the following criteria (Council of the European Union, 2018):
1. Not all participants in the arrangement are tax resident in the same jurisdiction.
2. A permanent establishment linked to any of the participants is established in
a different jurisdiction, and the arrangement forms part of the business of the
permanent establishment.
3. At least one of the participants in the arrangement carries on activities in another
jurisdiction without being resident for tax purposes or creating a permanent
establishment situated in that jurisdiction.
4. At least one of the participants has a dual residency for tax purposes.
5. Such an arrangement can impact the automatic exchange of information or identify
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beneficial ownership.
These cross-border arrangements, specifically for aggressive tax planning, may concern
individuals, legal persons (i.e. companies) or legal arrangements (i.e. trusts and
foundations), all of whom are classified as taxpayers. Under the new council directive
an intermediary, who sells reportable cross-border arrangements to their clients, should
report the information on the arrangement to the tax authorities of the member state
to which the client belongs. An intermediary can be an individual or a company(i.e.,
accountants, lawyers, banks, financial advisors, etc.). However, in some cases, the directive
shifts the obligation of reporting from the intermediary to the taxpayer.(Council of the
European Union, 2018) The obligation to report the arrangements shifts to the taxpayer
when (Council of the European Union, 2018):
1. The intermediary is a non-EU intermediary. An intermediary is considered non-EU
when it qualifies under all the following conditions:
• It is not resident in any member state of the EU.
• It does not maintain a permanent establishment in any member state of the
EU.
• It is not incorporated/governed by the laws of any member state of the EU.
• It is not a member of a professional association in any member state of the EU.
2. If there is no intermediary involved.
3. If the intermediary has a right to waiver reporting due to legal professional privilege.
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The significance of DAC6 is that it tries to fill in the gaps left by the CRS in dealing with
AEOI concerning reporting of cross-border financial account information. DAC2, which
came into force through council directive 2014/107/EU amended DAC1 to incorporate the
CRS at the EU level (Casi et al., 2020a). Under the CRS, only the financial institution
maintaining the accounts of the customer was responsible for reporting the information,
provided a self-certification is supplied by the customer of her tax residency (Noked, 2018;
Casi et al., 2019). If the customer failed to disclose the details of her tax residency to
the financial institution, the account information would not be reported (Avi-Yonah and
Mazzoni, 2018). There was no liability of reporting on behalf of the customer or any other
intermediary that was party to the account being opened. All versions of the Directive on
Administrative Cooperation before DAC6 did not address this gap. However, through
DAC6, the EU defined the reporting liability of all parties involved in addition to the
financial institution holding the accounts, i.e., of the intermediary advising the customer
and the customer herself. As mentioned before, all EU intermediaries involved in the
transaction (i.e., accountants, lawyers, banks, financial advisors, etc.) are responsible for
reporting the details of the cross-border arrangements unless exempted by law. Suppose
the intermediary is a non-EU intermediary or an intermediary exempted by law. In that
case, the customer, a taxpayer in one of the EU member states, is responsible for reporting
the cross-border arrangements. (Council of the European Union, 2018; Casi et al., 2019)
Another significant change made by DAC6 is the introduction of the classification of
cross-border arrangements based on hallmarks. A hallmark as per DAC6 refers to any
characteristic or feature of a cross-border arrangement that indicates a potential risk of tax
avoidance. There are five categories of hallmarks under DAC6. A reportable cross-border
arrangement is any cross-border arrangement that qualifies to be reported under one of the
five categories of hallmarks under DAC6. However, this study checks for dual citizenship
as a method of regulatory arbitrage against category D hallmarks of DAC6. Category
D hallmarks are specific hallmarks concerning the AEOI and beneficial ownership. An
arrangement should be reported under this category if it has the effect of undermining the
rules, or the absence thereof, on beneficial ownership or any other equivalent agreement
on AEOI.(Council of the European Union, 2018) A detailed description of the categories
of hallmarks and the various transactions they cover can be found in the Council directive
2018/822/EU of the European Union. DAC6 gave a substantial boost to tax authorities in
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trying to curb aggressive tax planning by introducing mandatory disclosure rules, which
mandate all cross-border arrangements qualifying under the hallmarks of DAC6 to be
reported. Before DAC6, this was not evidenced.
However, as per Kaeser et al. (2018), DAC6 increases the cost of reporting for intermediaries
and taxpayers as collecting and transmitting the information falling under the various
hallmarks of DAC6 involves substantial costs. Moreover Kaeser et al. (2018) also says
that the implementation of DAC6 also has additional costs for the tax authorities, who
have to invest in IT infrastructure to analyze and exchange the information.
2.4 Theoretical example
In this subsection we first introduce a theoretical example of how AEOI takes place under
CRS. We explain the drawbacks of CRS with the help of the example. After that we
explain how DAC6 tries to address the drawbacks of CRS. Finally, we present another
example to explain how dual citizenship can be used to circumvent DAC6 and act as a
method of regulatory arbitrage.
The following is an example of how CRS and AEOI work. Assume a taxpayer of France
currently living in Panama. When she tries to open a financial account in a bank or
any other financial institution in Panama, she has to self-certify the details of her tax
residency to the financial institution. The definition of tax resident varies from country to
country, and one can find the details of the same in the OECD portal (OECD, 2021b).
The financial institution in Panama then shares the details of the customer’s financial
accounts to the tax authorities in Panama, who in turn share the details periodically with
the tax authorities in France. This information is automatically exchanged as both France
and Panama are signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreements(MCAA)
(OECD, 2021c).
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) was one of the early and pioneering studies on tax evasion.
The study emphasises that the income of the individual is not known to the tax authorities
and this information asymmetry between the two parties is the incentive for the taxpayer
to evade taxes, given that there is no mechanism to detect and penalize the activity.
By assuming that the taxpayer conforms to the Von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms for
behaviour under uncertainty, they show that higher penalties on evaded taxes and a higher
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probability of detection might lead to higher income declaration. However, in the case of
CRS, it has to be observed that the information exchange is not between the taxpayer and
the tax authorities (Noked, 2018). It is facilitated by a financial institution (hereafter FI)
which maintains the accounts of the taxpayer. The presence of a financial institution for
reporting the data reduces the risk of detection for a taxpayer as she can falsely self-certify
her tax residency(Avi-Yonah and Mazzoni, 2018) thereby allowing to circumvent CRS and
AEOI.
In this case, though the financial institution does not increase the probability of tax evasion
purposefully, it happens due to the information asymmetry that exists between the taxpayer
and the financial institution. Also, since the penalty for non-compliance is imposed on
the financial institution and not on the customer, the need to righteously self-certify tax
residency details further reduces for the individual. Moreover, another important thing
to be noted here is that the taxpayer might be advised by other intermediaries(such as
accountants, lawyers, banks, financial advisors, etc.), in France or other EU countries,
that help in the process of opening accounts in Panama. However, such intermediaries
are also not liable to report the details of the financial account information to the tax
authorities in France.
Another way that the taxpayer can avoid CRS is by relocating the accounts to a country
that is not party to the CRS like USA, Paraguay or Cambodia (Henderson, 2020). Since
these countries are not party to the CRS, unless a TIEA exists between France and these
countries, disclosure of account information is very difficult. Even when the TIEA exists,
information is only exchanged if a request is made by the French tax authorities and is
not exchanged automatically. In this case also, if there is an intermediary advising the
taxpayer and facilitating the relocation of the financial accounts, neither the intermediary
or taxpayer has any liability to report the details of the accounts.
When DAC6 comes into effect, it makes the intermediary(if the intermediary is an EU
intermediary), that is advising and facilitating the accounts of the taxpayer, as well as
the taxpayer accountable for disclosure of all information. Even if the financial institution
in Panama is not informed of the tax residency status of the taxpayer, the intermediary
as well as the taxpayer are now liable to inform the French tax authorities of the accounts
maintained in Panama if they qualify under hallmark D of DAC6. The added advantage
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that DAC6 has is that under DAC6 the taxpayer and the intermediary advising the
taxpayer are penalized in case of non-disclosure of such financial accounts. The penalties
vary from €5,100 by Bulgaria to €4.4 million by Poland( (PWC, 2020). The penalty deters
the intermediary and the taxpayer from implementing the cross-border arrangements
through aggressive tax planning mechanisms. The intermediary is at a greater risk as
it faces both reputational and monetary losses in case of non-compliance. Even if the
taxpayer locates his accounts to a non-CRS country, he is still liable to report the accounts.
In the future if France signs a TIEA with such a country, there is the possibility that
the accounts of the taxpayer might then be disclosed causing him to be penalized for
non-disclosure. However, dual citizenship can still be one of the methods through which
the taxpayer might circumvent the DAC6. In the following example, a description of how
dual citizenship can be used as a method of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6 is given.
Let us consider the same example of a French taxpayer who currently resides in Panama.
Let us, however, assume now that the taxpayer also has dual citizenship and holds a
Taiwanese citizenship in addition to the French citizenship. When DAC6 comes into
force, if the taxpayer does not want the details of her financial accounts in Panama
to be reported to the French tax authorities, she would not declare her French tax
residency to the financial institution. She would now declare to the financial institution
in Panama that she is a tax resident of Taiwan and would use her Taiwanese passport
and identification documents to open and operate the accounts. She would also use the
services of a Taiwanese or non-EU intermediary to open the accounts in Panama as non-EU
intermediaries are not required to report the details of the cross-border arrangements
under DAC6. However, in this case the taxpayer is still liable to disclose the details of
the accounts to the French tax authorities. Then why does the customer not disclose
the details herself to the French tax authorities? The answer lies in the fact that the
probability of detection of the accounts by the French tax authorities reduces significantly
now, incentivizing the customer to not disclose the details of her accounts.
When AEOI takes place under CRS, Panama only reports the account details of the
taxpayer to Taiwan as she has used her Taiwanese passport and other identification
documents to open the accounts and has declared herself as a Taiwanese tax resident.
However, the account details are not known to the French tax authorities. In this case,
2.4 Theoretical example 15
the French tax authorities will find it very difficult to access the account details even on
request. When requested the Panamanian tax authorities can refuse the request of the
French tax authorities saying that the account does not belong to a French tax resident.
Even if a TIEA is in place between France and Panama, Panama would still not disclose
the details of the taxpayer to the French authorities as they recognize the taxpayer as only
a tax resident of Taiwan. Even when DAC6 comes into effect, there is very little possibility
of the French tax authorities accessing that information. Moreover, since the taxpayer,
knows that an EU intermediary will have to report such transactions, uses the services
of a non-EU intermediary in opening the accounts. In such an instance, the French tax
authorities will have to solely depend on the disclosure provided by the customer. As
the customer knows that the probability of Panama disclosing the details of the accounts
is very less, she will not disclose the details of the accounts. Since Taiwan is a non-EU
country the details of cross-border arrangements of Taiwanese taxpayers is not available
to the EU member states under DAC6. The French tax authorities can still perform an
investigation through law enforcement agencies to obtain information on the accounts but
it will need the help of tax authorities from Taiwan and Panama. Given the complexity
of the investigation and the cooperation of multiple parties the probability of detection
would be very less. In this way, dual citizenship can be used to circumvent the DAC6 and
be a method of regulatory arbitrage.
Let us now assume that the taxpayer in our case is a citizen of Netherlands, an EU country
that does not offer dual citizenship to it’s citizens. The option of availing the citizenship
of another country to route the cross-border arrangements is absent here. If the taxpayer
decides to obtain the citizenship of another country, she automatically loses the citizenship
of the Netherlands. If the incentives of being a citizen of the Netherlands are high, then
taxpayer would not relinquish it. If the taxpayer does not relinquish her Dutch citizenship,
then she will comply with the DAC6 and report the deposits as non-compliance can
attract severe penalties. Suppose she renounces the citizenship of the Netherlands. In
that case, she ceases to be a citizen and a taxpayer for all income earned outside the
borders of Netherlands, and there is effectively no regulatory arbitrage here.
An important point to be noted here is that dual citizenship can also be used as a method
of regulatory arbitrage against CRS as well. However, since DAC6 was introduced with
16 2.5 Significance of the study
the objective of plugging the gaps of CRS, we try to evaluate whether dual citizenship
can be used to circumvent the DAC6 as mentioned in the example. As part of this study,
we try to empirically test whether there is possible causality between the dual citizenship
of countries and the cross-border deposits held by the residents of these countries with
respect to the introduction of DAC6. The strong correlation between dual citizenship
and the cross-border deposits could indicate the possible causality of dual citizenship as a
method of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6.
2.5 Significance of the study
The Directive on Administrative Cooperation has existed since the year 2011. However,
for the first time in 2018, DAC6 has enabled mandatory disclosure of cross-border
arrangements taking a giant leap in curbing cross-border arrangements, specifically taken
up for aggressive tax planning. The introduction of these mandatory disclosure guidelines
also adds more momentum to the existing framework of AEOI, at least from an EU
perspective, in tackling aggressive tax planning activities. Despite the importance of
DAC6, few studies have assessed the impact of DAC6 on curbing aggressive tax planning.
The normative research of DAC6 by Casi et al. (2020a) is one of the few studies that
assess DAC6 and provide valuable suggestions. Other legal studies such as Cachia (2018);
Clappers and Mac-Lean (2019); Peeters and Vanneste (2020) and Resenig (2020) have
provided valuable information. However, none of these studies has empirically evaluated
the effect of DAC6 or methods that can be used to circumvent the DAC6. This study was
therefore designed to fill in the fore-mentioned gap in the literature.
The other gap in the existing literature that this study tends to address is that of dual
citizenship as a method of regulatory arbitrage for tax evasion and avoidance. There are
very few studies that address regulatory arbitrage against policies such as CRS or DAC6.
Ahrens et al. (2020) is one such study. However, the study only checks the effect of golden
visas(synonymous for citizenship or residency by investment schemes) and corporate shells
as methods of regulatory arbitrage against AEOI. Despite dual citizenship being listed as
one of the possible methods of circumventing AEOI, studies assessing the effect of dual
citizenship, in general, have not been evidenced.
The study by Langenmayr and Zyska (2021) though measuring the effect of dual citizenship
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on tax evasion, only checks the impact of the CBI program offered by 12 countries
worldwide. Moreover, the study also considers a period from the year 2010 to 2018. It
does not show the precise impact that the schemes have on CRS or AEOI, particularly as
most of the countries currently offering CBI(excluding Serbia, St. Lucia and Vanuatu)
started the CBI programs before 2014 (Christians, 2017). Also, the study does not
tell us if the offshore deposits of citizens of these countries increased significantly post
introduction of CRS or pre-introduction of CRS. Apart from the studies by Casi et al.
(2020b); Menkhoff and Miethe (2019); Langenmayr and Zyska (2021), no other empirical
studies have been witnessed studying the effect on offshore deposits in the recent past.
Studies such as Knobel and Meinzer (2014); Knobel (2016); Gadzo and Klemencic (2017);
Noked (2018); Avi-Yonah and Mazzoni (2018) have outlined some of the possible factors
affecting the implementation of AEOI. Still, the effect of none of these factors has been
tested empirically.
Therefore, the study has been designed to address these gaps in the existing literature
concerning dual citizenship as a method of regulatory arbitrage. Since the category D
hallmarks of DAC6 are specific hallmarks concerning the AEOI and beneficial ownership,
the study can also serve as a base for any further investigations that study regulatory
arbitrage of AEOI or CRS.
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3 Data & Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data on cross-border deposits
The data on the cross-border deposits are obtained from the Bank of International
Settlements-Locational Banking Statistics (BIS-LBS) database (Bank of International
Settlements, 2021). The database consists of the cross-border deposits held by the residents
and resident companies of 215 countries and autonomous territories in a select list of
31 countries. Though 49 countries currently report the total volume of the cross-border
deposits held by them, the individual country wise data of deposits held are only reported
by 31 countries. We refer to these 31 countries as the deposit locations. The 215 countries
whose residents or resident companies hold the deposits in the 31 deposit locations will be
called resident countries. The database has both liabilities and claims of a country, but
we do not consider the country’s claims. Only the liabilities, which are indicators of the
deposits held by residents or companies (hereafter referred to as non-bank deposits) of
a country in select cross border locations, are extracted from the database. We exclude
the bank deposits held by banks of a resident country in a deposit location as inter-bank
deposits cannot be a possible source of tax evasion (Johanessen and Zucman, 2014).
The BIS-LBS database records the deposits for every quarter till September 2020. For
this study, we extract data on cross-border deposits from the first quarter of 2016 till the
third quarter of 2020. The reason for selecting the first quarter of 2016 as the starting
point is that the financial institutions located in early-adopter countries started collecting
information on new foreign reportable accounts for the CRS from this quarter(Casi et al.,
2019). This date marks the start of the effective implementation of the CRS. CRS
kickstarted the notion of automatic exchange of information on a global level. Since
the assumption made is that dual citizenship undermines hallmark D of DAC6, which
emphasises the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) and Beneficial Ownership of
cross-border deposits or investments, data before the implementation of CRS might invite
an unwanted bias in the estimations of the study. A descriptive summary of the deposits
in the deposit locations over the entire study period is given in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of cross-border deposits in the deposit locations
Deposit Location Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hong Kong 3465 2093.03 12539.327 .127 173028.7
Jersey 3279 329.675 1653.474 1 22614
Guernsey 3014 151.786 708.36 .001 7982.054
Macau SAR 2134 288.197 1753.732 .001 22846.017
Isle of Man 3877 123.102 754.249 .001 12513.385
Luxembourg 3725 742.714 2703.398 .001 30826.838
Switzerland 4006 1476.89 4113.833 .001 46297.744
Australia 3775 317.567 1640.1 .001 31534.931
Brazil 554 102.444 780.298 1 8788
Canada 3023 1003.41 9797.175 .009 145556.9
Chile 1715 8.946 100.497 .001 2021.109
Taiwan 3770 423.063 2389.621 .001 33170.934
Korea 2957 108.79 511.29 -3.946 7528.273
Mexico 229 133.757 499.494 .001 4379.143
United States 2647 9787.07 50062.435 4 578294
South Africa 1995 40.618 136.999 0 1844
Netherlands 1114 2861.219 7978.752 3.162 67781.736
Belgium 3933 411.093 1982.403 .001 36047.993
Greece 629 20.924 54.765 .001 455
Sweden 3461 176.196 830.314 0 16021.99
France 3697 4275.955 22755.305 1 286916
Spain 3675 359.29 1485.619 .011 25168.353
Denmark 2891 208.706 914.154 .001 11747.14
Ireland 3081 356.9 1713.832 .001 18877.759
Finland 2072 145.586 844.145 .001 17494.083
United Kingdom 3794 8333.395 47845.068 0 785456
Austria 3762 241.2 1348.005 0 19923.025
Philippines 2188 18.38 77.531 .001 1224.523
Italy 2849 307.749 1599.884 .001 20927.228
Notes:The table depicts the quarterly cross-border deposits of non-bank deposits of all the
resident countries in the specific deposit location from the 1st quarter of 2016 to the 3rd quarter
of 2020. All values except observations are in US$ million.
The data is further classified based on specific characteristics of the resident countries
or the deposit locations. The first classification is for the resident countries divided into
countries that offer dual citizenship and countries that do not offer dual citizenship. Next,
the resident countries are divided into countries that belong to the European Union(EU)
and those that do not belong to the EU. This classification primarily helps to understand
the effect of DAC6 on the EU countries. It has to be noted that the United Kingdom is
also considered as a part of the EU for this study since the United Kingdom left the EU
only on 31st January 2020 (Government of Netherlands, 2021) and the transition period
for Brexit ended on 31st December 2020 (Gibson Dunn, 2021).
Moreover, the UK had officially introduced the DAC6 into the UK law on 1st July
2020. All transactions till the end of 2020 will be reported under DAC6 (Gibson Dunn,
2021). Residence countries are also divided into countries that offer a Citizenship by
Investment(CBI) program or scheme and those that do not offer such schemes. The
data for the countries offering CBI programs were taken from the list of CBI countries
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compiled by Christians (2017). It has to be noted that the CBI countries automatically
qualify for dual citizenship as well. The CBI countries are further divided into aggressive
CBI countries and non-aggressive CBI countries based on the study by Langenmayr and
Zyska (2021). A descriptive summary of the deposits of residence countries based on their
classifications is given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of cross-border deposits in the residence countries
































1017.915 13321.300 0 578294 16889
Notes: The table depicts the quarterly cross-border deposits of non-bank deposits of resident
countries based on their classification of whether the country is an EU country, whether the
country offers dual citizenship or not and based on whether the deposits belong to the pre-DAC
6 period or the post-DAC 6 period. All values except observations are in US$ million.
The deposit locations, similar to the residence countries, are also classified into different
types. Deposit locations are first classified into tax haven deposit locations and non-tax
haven deposit locations. The classification of deposit locations as tax havens is based
on Casi et al. (2020b). The study considers Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Hong Kong,
Switzerland and Luxembourg as the tax haven deposit locations and a similar classification
is also adopted for this study. Finally, the deposit locations are also classified as EU
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deposit locations or not. The DAC 6 was initiated by the EU on June 25, 2018. All
transactions initiated on or after June 25, 2018, have to be reported to the tax authorities
of the respective EU nations irrespective of whenever the DAC 6 law comes into full
effect in any EU country. Therefore, the cross-border deposits are split into two groups,
pre-DAC 6 deposits and post-DAC 6 deposits. Since June 25 falls within the second
quarter of the year 2018, deposits up to the 1st quarter of 2018 are considered pre-DAC 6
deposits, and deposits from the 2nd quarter of 2018 are considered post-DAC 6 deposits.
However, the data obtained from the BIS-LBS database has its limitations. The data of
deposits held by residents and resident companies are not distinguished. Therefore, it is
hard to establish whether the deposits belong to individuals or companies. The limitation
has been pointed out in previous studies, such as Casi et al. (2020b) and Langenmayr
and Zyska (2021). However, that is not a significant limitation to our study as companies
controlling persons with dual citizenship might still use it to invest the deposits of their
firms in offshore locations, and the data on such deposits have to be included. Recent
trends suggest that there has been a tremendous growth in foreign direct investment (FDI)
in countries (te Velde, 2006). As per the definition of OECD, a controlling person of an
entity is one who ultimately has a controlling ownership interest, which in most countries
is 25%. However, in case no natural person(s) exercise control through ownership, then
the controlling person of the entity is deemed to be the natural person holding a senior
managerial position. Now let us assume that there are 5 foreign individuals each holding
20% share in a firm that operates in a country that is not the home country of any of the
five individuals. In this case, we can observe that as a collective they hold 100% share in
the entity. However, none of them are reportable as per the definition of OECD. Therefore,
there can be possible instances of such companies which do not disclose the names of their
actual owners, though eventually as a collective, they are enjoying the benefits. The data
on deposits from the BIS-LBS database has widely been used as a proxy for tax evasion
previously in studies by Huizinga and Nicodème (2004); Johanessen and Zucman (2014);
Casi et al. (2020b); Langenmayr and Zyska (2021); Johannesen (2014).
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3.2 Data on dual citizenship
The data on countries offering dual citizenship was taken from the website of Arton
Capital (Arton Capital, 2021). This service company helps high net worth individuals in
obtaining dual residency/citizenship around the world. The list obtained from the website
was again cross verified with other websites such as www.dualcitizenshipreport.org that
hold information on an individual country basis and explain whether the country allows
dual-citizenship without restrictions or allows it with certain restrictions. All the countries
in the list offered dual citizenship throughout the study, Norway being the only exception.
Norway introduced dual citizenship on 1st January 2020 (Utlendingsdirektoratet, 2020).
The list of countries offering dual citizenship is provided in the appendix.
The data on countries offering dual citizenship also has its limitations. A singular source
for the data on countries offering dual citizenship could not be found. Therefore, data from
multiple sources have been used in constructing this list of dual citizenship countries. Most
of this data has been obtained from various websites, the details of which are presented in
the appendix. However, the possibility that some countries can be disputed as not offering
dual citizenship is present. Some countries have mild to severe restrictions on granting
dual citizenship. In some other countries, the number of citizens with dual citizenship
might be too few to make an impact. Care has been taken to prepare the list as accurately
as possible.
Some of the countries in the list offer dual citizenship only on a conditional basis. So
the number of people eligible for dual citizenship in these countries are also very few.
Moreover, the conditions are vague in many cases making it very difficult to understand
the people who qualify for dual citizenship in these countries. For example, South Korea
and Austria both do not offer dual citizenship in general. However, both countries make
exemptions to individuals who are of importance to their countries and can contribute to
the betterment of these countries (Proell, 2021). So, there is a possibility that high-value
individuals who might be of great help to these economies can obtain dual citizenship
in these countries. Also, Austria and South Korea rank relatively high in the Financial
Secrecy Index - 2020 Results compiled by the Tax Justice Network. That is why both
these countries also find a place in the list of countries offering dual citizenship. Some
other countries offer dual citizenship only to residents of select countries with which they
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have agreements. One such example is Argentina. Argentina offers dual citizenship to
the citizens of Spain and Italy only (Habib, 2016). It does not allow the citizens of other
countries to obtain Argentinean citizenship without relinquishing the existing citizenship.
However, Argentina is included in the list. Argentina’s agreements are with EU countries,
and DAC 6 is mainly on the EU countries. An entire list of the restrictions applied by
the countries is provided in the appendix.
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4 Research Methodology & Design
The research methodology or framework for the study consists of multiple regression
models, each of which is explained in individual subsections. In each subsection, we
describe the research design that has been adopted for the model. An explanation of
the design follows it. The subsections are ordered logically to portray the effects of dual
citizenship on DAC 6.
4.1 Effect of dual citizenship on cross-border deposits
We first measure the effect of dual citizenship in general on the cross-border non-bank
deposits in the entire set of deposit locations. A simple panel regression model is used to
estimate the effect of dual citizenship on the cross-border deposits of residence countries
over the entire period of time. The regression model is as follows:
lnDepositsijt = α + β1Dual_Citizenshipit + γjt + θij + εijt (4.1)
In the regression model, lnDepositsijt represents the log of deposits of residence country
i in deposit location j in time period t. The Dual_Citizenshipit takes a value of 1 for
residence country i in period t if the country offers dual citizenship. It takes a value of
0 if the residence country does not offer dual citizenship. We include a deposit-location
quarter-year time fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2019), represented by γjt. These time fixed
effects allow us to control any common time trends affecting the deposit location, which
might cause a higher or lower influx of deposits into the location. Since dual citizenship
is a characteristic of the residence country, taking residence-country quarter-year fixed
effects will not result in multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 2019). We also include ordered
country-pair fixed effects, represented by θij. These ordered country-pair fixed effects
allow us to control all time-invariant country-pair factors that might affect cross-border
deposits. The standard errors are cluster-robust with clustering at the residence country
level. We cluster the standard errors (Abadie et al., 2017) at the residence country level
because this is where we expect the change in deposits to happen due to the presence of
the residence country having a dual citizenship scheme. The error term is denoted by εijt.
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However, from the compiled list of dual citizenship countries, we can observe that
most developed western economies in Europe and North America offer dual citizenship.
Therefore, we break down the deposit locations into tax haven deposit locations and
non-tax haven deposit locations and execute the model. For a long time, tax haven deposit
locations have been important centres of secrecy and are highly preferred by individuals
and corporations to evade taxes and hide their assets (Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2021). So,
the notion behind this break down of data is that if dual citizenship is not a method of
regulatory arbitrage, then the difference in deposit levels in both tax havens and non-tax
havens should be similar for residence countries offering dual citizenship and residence
countries not offering dual citizenship.
For a final assessment, we drop Luxembourg from the list of tax havens and execute the
model on the other tax haven deposit locations. According to the world handbook of
CIA (CIA.gov, 2021), Luxembourg is a financial powerhouse and is home to the world’s
second-largest investment fund asset domicile, after the US. The handbook also says that
though Luxembourg has lost some of its advantages due to the LuxLeaks, it continues to
be an important financial centre in the world. There could be a very high possibility that
the deposits of large multinational companies present in Luxembourg could be a reason for
an abnormal difference in the deposit levels between countries having dual citizenship and
not having dual citizenship. Eliminating Luxembourg from the list can give us a better
picture of the deposits held in tax havens by individual high net-worth investors and small
companies, which can be used to conceal the nationality of the controlling persons.
4.2 Effect of dual citizenship on cross-border deposits
post-DAC6
In the first part of the framework, we have only measured the standalone effect of dual
citizenship on cross-border deposits. In this part, we try to measure the effect of dual
citizenship after DAC6 by the EU. For this model, we use a difference-in-difference
(henceforth referred to as DiD) (Angrist and Pischke, 2014) design to estimate the average
effect of dual citizenship on the cross-border deposits post-DAC6 initiation. The DiD
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design model is as follows:
lnDepositsijt = α + β1Dual_Citizenshipit
+ β2DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗Dual_Citizenshipit
+ γjt + θij + εijt
(4.2)
In this model, we get an estimate of the effect of dual citizenship post-DAC 6 initiation from
the interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗Dual_Citizenshipit. The DAC_6_Initiated
is the same for every ordered country-pair in the dataset, which takes a value of 1 from
the second quarter of 2018 and a value of 0 before that. The interaction term gives the
difference in pre-DAC6 deposit levels and post-DAC6 deposit levels of resident countries
offering dual citizenship against those not offering dual citizenship. We control for the
deposit-location quarter-year time fixed effects, γjt, and the time-invariant ordered country-
pair fixed effects, θij, just like in the first model. The standard errors are cluster-robust
with clustering at the residence country level. The error term is denoted by εijt.
Similar to the previous model, we break down the deposit locations into tax haven deposit
locations and non-tax haven deposit locations and execute the model. Finally, we drop
Luxembourg from the list of tax havens and execute the model on the other tax haven
deposit locations. Another point that has to be observed is that Luxembourg is the
only tax haven within the EU and is directly affected by the DAC6. Therefore, the last
scenario of the model can give a much better picture of the effect of dual citizenship on
cross-border deposits post-DAC6.
4.3 Effect of DAC6 on cross-border deposits of EU
Residence countries
In this part of the framework, we design a model used to estimate DAC6 on the cross-
border deposits of EU residence countries. This model has been designed to specifically
test research question 2. The DAC6 guidelines call for stricter reporting of cross-border
deposits, and therefore it is crucial to assess the impact of the DAC6 on the deposits
of EU residence countries. Similar to the second part, where we assessed the effect of
dual citizenship post-DAC6, we use a DiD design to estimate the effect of DAC6 on the
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cross-border deposits of EU residence countries. The DiD design model is as follows:
lnDepositsijt = α + β1EU_Countryit
+ β2DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ EU_Countryit
+ γjt + θij + εijt
(4.3)
In this model, we get an estimate of the effect of DAC6 on EU residence countries from the
interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ EU_Countryit. The EU_Countryit term takes
a value of 1 if the residence country belongs to the EU and a value of 0 if it does not
belong to the EU. We control for the deposit-location quarter-year time fixed effects, γjt,
and the time-invariant ordered country-pair fixed effects, θij. The standard errors are
cluster-robust with clustering at the residence country level. The error term is denoted by
εijt.
After the initial assessment, we assess whether reporting of cross-border deposits of EU
residence countries have increased from the tax haven deposit locations or not. These are
the locations where most of the undisclosed cross-border deposits are held. So, we break
down the data set into tax haven deposit locations and non-tax haven deposit location
and run the model. Also, we would like to assess whether the deposit levels have increased
throughout all tax havens or only from Luxembourg. So, we remove Luxembourg from the
set of tax haven deposit locations and run the model. We also run the model individually
for the deposits reported from Luxembourg. The idea is that Luxembourg is the only
deposit location that is situated in the EU and officially comes under DAC6.
4.4 Effect of CBI programs on cross-border deposits
post-DAC6
In this part of the framework, we design a model used to estimate the effect of CBI
schemes on cross-border deposits post-DAC6 and whether such schemes are being used
more actively post-DAC6. This model has been specifically designed to address research
question 3. We use a DiD design to estimate the effect of CBI schemes on the cross-border
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deposits post-DAC6. The DiD design model is as follows:
lnDepositsijt = α + β1CBI_Country_RCit
+ β2DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ CBI_Country_RCit
+ γjt + θij + εijt
(4.4)
The estimate of the effect of CBI schemes on cross-border deposits post-DAC6 is
obtained from the interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ CBI_Country_RCit. The
term CBI_Country_RCit takes a value of 1 if the residence country i has a CBI scheme
in period t and a value of zero otherwise. We control for the deposit-location quarter-year
time fixed effects, γjt, and the time-invariant ordered country-pair fixed effects, θij. The
standard errors are cluster-robust with clustering at the residence country level. The error
term is denoted by εijt.
After the initial assessment, we break down the data set into tax haven deposit locations
and non-tax haven deposit locations and rerun the model. Finally, we remove Luxembourg
from the list of tax haven locations and rerun the model as Luxembourg is an EU country
directly affected by DAC6.
For the second part of the framework on the effect of CBI countries, we categorize some of
the CBI countries as aggressive CBI residence countries. This classification is based on the
study by Langenmayr and Zyska (2021), where they only check the effect of high-risk CBI
schemes on cross-border deposits. The countries used by Langenmayr and Zyska (2021),
along with Panama, are categorized as aggressive CBI residence countries. The idea
behind this classification is to check whether high-risk CBI programs have a significantly
different effect than other CBI programs. We use a DiD design to estimate the effect of
high-risk CBI schemes on the cross-border deposits post-DAC6. The DiD design model is
as follows:
lnDepositsijt = α + β3Aggressive_CBI_Country_RCit
+ β4DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ Aggressive_CBI_Country_RCit
+ γjt + θij + εijt
(4.5)
The estimate of the effect of high-risk CBI schemes on cross-border deposits
post-DAC6 is obtained from the interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗
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Aggressive_CBI_Country_RCit. The term Aggressive_CBI_Country_RCit
takes a value of 1 if the residence country i has a high-risk CBI scheme in period t and
a value of zero otherwise. We control for the deposit-location quarter-year time fixed
effects, γjt, and the time-invariant ordered country-pair fixed effects, θij. The standard
errors are cluster-robust with clustering at the residence country level. The error term is
denoted by εijt. After the initial assessment, we break down the data set into tax haven
deposit locations and non-tax haven deposit locations and rerun the model. Finally, we
remove Luxembourg from the list of tax haven locations and run the model.
4.5 Effect of DAC6 on cross-border deposits in EU
deposit locations
In this part of the framework, we design a model used to estimate DAC6 on cross-border
deposits in EU deposit locations. The idea behind this assessment is that post-DAC6, all
EU countries have to adapt to the strict reporting guidelines, which entails a higher cost
of compliance for both depositors and intermediaries. Therefore, assessing the deposit
levels in the EU deposit locations might throw some light on how countries react to the
DAC6. We use a DiD design to estimate the effect of DAC6 on the cross-border deposits
in EU deposit locations. The DiD design model is as follows:
lnDepositsijt = α + β1EU_Country_DLjt
+ β2DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ EU_Country_DLjt
+ δit + θij + εijt
(4.6)
In this model, we get an estimate of the effect of DAC6 on cross-border deposits in EU
deposit locations from the interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ EU_Country_DLjt.
The EU_Country_DLjt term takes a value of 1 if the deposit location belongs to the
EU and a value of 0 if the deposit location does not belong to the EU. However, we do not
control the deposit-location quarter-year time fixed effects like in the previous scenarios.
Instead, we control the residence-country quarter-year time fixed effects, represented by
δit. Since the EU deposit location changes between the control and the treatment group
controlling for deposit-location quarter-year time fixed effects leads to a multicollinearity
problem. We control for the ordered country-pair fixed effects, θij like in the previous
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sections. The standard errors are cluster-robust with clustering at the residence country
level. The error term is denoted by εijt.
After the initial assessment, we break down the data set based on multiple conditions and
run the model:
1. For those residence countries offering dual citizenship.
2. For residence countries not offering dual citizenship.
3. For EU residence countries offering dual citizenship and EU residence countries
not offering dual citizenship separately. After that, we run the model for non-EU
residence countries offering dual citizenship and non-EU countries not offering dual
citizenship separately.
4. For EU residence countries with dual citizenship that offer CBI program, EU
residence countries with dual citizenship but not offering CBI programs, non-EU
countries with dual citizenship and offering CBI programs and non-EU countries
with dual citizenship not offering CBI programs separately.
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5 Results & Analysis
The results are divided into two parts. In the first part, we have a glimpse and analyse
the results from the descriptive statistics through graphs of deposits for different data
sets, and then we move on to analyse the results from the various regression models.
5.1 Descriptive evidence and analysis
The main deterministic characteristic of this study is the dual citizenship status of a
country. Since the study hypothesises that dual citizenship might be one of the methods of
regulatory arbitrage, to better understand the movements of the deposits in the countries
having dual citizenship and the countries not having dual citizenship throughout the
study, we plot the deposits over time, as shown in Figure 5.1. The results are also checked
for both sets of countries before and after DAC6 initiation.
Figure 5.1: Deposits over time representation for countries having dual citizenship and
countries not having dual citizenship
The red dashed line in the figure is the point of initiation of the DAC6. It falls in
the 9th period as DAC6 was introduced after that period, namely the 2nd quarter of
2018. From the figure, we can observe that for countries with dual citizenship, there has
been a continuous growth in deposits from period 4, i.e., from the 1st quarter of 2017
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till DAC6. It can be observed that there is a sharp fall in the deposits from countries
having dual citizenship after the 3rd period. However, it has to be understood that
the effective implementation of AEOI under CRS started in January 2016. Therefore,
after the start of AEOI, we see that there has been a correction in the deposit levels.
Even here, we can observe that the fall in deposits has been much more for countries
with dual citizenship than for countries not having dual citizenship, substantiating the
argument that dual citizenship might be an effective tool for regulatory arbitrage. After
the initiation of DAC 6, we see that the deposit growth has reduced but is still more than
that for countries without dual citizenship, and the gap between the two sets continues to
increase. However, the sudden stop in the growth of deposits from countries having dual
citizenship post-DAC6 is intriguing. From the graph, we could assume that the shock
from post-DAC6 might have affected the deposits from these countries.
However, since the DAC6 profoundly affects the EU countries and the deposits held by
the residents of EU countries, we break down the data further and extract the descriptive
statistics. The details of the same are already presented in Table 3.1. From Table 3.1, we
can observe that the mean of deposits for EU countries having dual citizenship shows an
increase of 15.06% from pre-DAC6 levels. The change for non-EU countries with dual
citizenship is 12.51%, whereas the change for EU countries and non-EU countries without
dual citizenship is only 8.23% and 5.6%, respectively. A pictorial representation of the
statistics for both sets of countries is presented in Figure 5.2. The individual figures are
titled ’EU Countries’ and ’Non-EU Countries’.
Figure 5.2: Deposits over time representation for EU and Non-EU Countries
In the first figure for the EU countries, we can observe that the growth in deposit
levels was similar for both the countries with dual citizenship and those without dual
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citizenship. However, post-DAC6, we can observe that though the deposits from countries
with dual citizenship continue to grow, the countries without dual citizenship tend to
reduce drastically and recover later. A significant correction in the deposit levels happens
post-DAC6 in the countries without dual citizenship. This correction, however, can be
attributed to the fact that the set of EU residence countries are only 3, namely the
Netherlands, Estonia and Slovakia. Two of these countries, Estonia and Slovakia, are
east-European countries with much smaller economies than the Netherlands. Changes in
the deposit levels of even one single country can cause a difference in the course of the
deposit levels of this set of countries. Therefore, it has to be viewed as an aberration due
to kinks and outliers rather than the effect of DAC6.
On the contrary, for non-EU countries having dual citizenship, we can observe that the
deposit levels rise continuously until the initiation of DAC6, after which the deposit
levels tend to stop growing. In fact, in the first few quarters, the deposits tend to take a
corrected path and go below the level of deposits of countries without dual citizenship.
In the last few quarters, however, the deposit levels tend to grow again and go beyond
countries’ deposits without dual citizenship. The countries without dual citizenship, on
the other hand, do not tend to go through any significant corrections in the course of study.
A possible explanation for this could be that people in countries with dual citizenship
might have taken some time to find alternate methods of routing the deposits. Therefore
we see a pause in the growth of deposit levels post-DAC 6. In both the graphs in Figure
5.2, we see a similar drop in deposits between period 3 and period 4 as observed in Figure
5.1, which might be due to the reporting of information under AEOI post-CRS.
The previous analysis, however, is performed over the entire set of deposit locations. We
now check how the deposit levels of EU and non-EU countries have varied in the EU
deposit locations and non-EU deposit locations. This check is an essential step of the
study since the DAC6 law introduced in the respective EU countries will make reporting
very strict and, therefore, comes with an additional reporting cost. Therefore, observing
the movement of deposits in these subsets of data might be very insightful. The graphs
for these two subsets of data are given in Figure 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Deposits over time representation for EU and Non-EU Countries in EU
deposit locations
In the EU deposit locations, we can observe that the deposit level increases over time
for EU residence countries with dual citizenship. For countries without dual citizenship,
we see a sharp correction in the deposit levels post-DAC6. Despite the irregular path
followed by the deposit level, eventually, the levels of the deposits tend to stabilise from
the 17th period. This uneven path can again be attributed to the fact that the list of EU
countries not having dual citizenship is very small. Any significant change in even one
country can cause substantial variations in the deposit level of the group on the whole.
For the deposits of non-EU countries in EU deposit locations, we can observe that for
countries with dual citizenship, the growth in deposit level observed till the start of DAC6
abruptly stops growing. This stop in the growth is very intriguing as DAC6 does not
apply to non-EU countries. For countries without dual citizenship, we see no profound
effect of DAC6, and the deposit levels continue to remain at a level similar to pre-DAC6
initiation. This helps us predict a change in the behaviour of investors from non-EU
countries with dual citizenship post-DAC6. Now, the stop in the growth of deposits in the
EU deposit locations can be due to two reasons, the first being a higher cost of compliance
for investors from non-EU countries and the second being the threat of being detected
while investing in EU deposit locations. For example, a resident of an EU residence
country having dual citizenship, who also possesses the citizenship of a non-EU residence
country, might avoid investing in EU deposit locations from the non-EU residence country
as the deposits might be detected due to the implementation of DAC6.
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Figure 5.4: Deposits over time representation for EU and Non-EU Countries in non-EU
deposit locations
In the case of non-EU deposit locations, we do not observe any significant changes post-
DAC6 initiation. Throughout the non-EU deposit locations, the deposit levels continue
to follow the trend observed pre-DAC6 irrespective of whether the residence country
belonged to the EU or not or whether it has dual citizenship. Finally, we plot the deposit
levels of CBI residence countries over the entire period and see how the deposit levels
from countries offering CBI programs have changed post-DAC6. The graph for the CBI
residence countries is as shown below.
Figure 5.5: Deposits over time representation for CBI residence countries
For the residence countries that offer CBI programs, we can observe from Figure 5.5 that
post-DAC6, the deposits from these countries have seen an exponential upward trend. The
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levels which were on a downward trend for the first few periods see a significant correction
and starts on an upward trend. From the figure, it is evident that these schemes have
become very lucrative post-DAC6. Since high-net-worth individuals primarily use the
CBI schemes for tax evasion (Langenmayr and Zyska, 2021), we can infer that post-DAC6
residents from countries having dual citizenship have been increasingly pursuing these
programs for regulatory arbitrage. Though the descriptive statistics give us a good glimpse
of how the deposit levels have changed over the different sets of residence countries and
deposit locations, they are of little help in accurately estimating the change in deposit
levels post-DAC6. For that, we now turn to the regression evidence.
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5.2 Regression evidence & analysis
In this part of the study, we provide the results from the regression models we constructed
in chapter 4. A detailed analysis of the cases or scenarios in each model follows the results.
5.2.1 Effect of dual citizenship on cross border deposits
The results from regression model 4.1 are presented in Table 5.2 below.
Table 5.1: Effect of dual citizenship on deposits in general
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dual Citizenship Dual Citizenship Dual Citizenship Dual Citizenship
Dual_Citizenship 0.152*** 0.455*** 0.0612*** 0.189***
(0.0131) (0.0211) (0.0157) (0.0222)
Observations 81,207 21,350 59,857 17,626
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.967
Country-pair FE YES YES YES YES
Deposit-time FE YES YES YES YES
Tax-Haven-DL YES NO YES
Luxembourg-DL NO
Robust standard error in parantheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Notes: The columns numbered (1)-(4) in the table represent the findings under different
data sets. The first column is for the entire data set. The second column is for the data
set containing the deposits in the tax haven deposit locations(Tax-Haven-DL is mentioned
as YES in the bottom). The third column is for the deposits held in non-tax haven deposit
locations(Tax-Haven-DL is mentioned as NO in the bottom). The final column is for the
deposits held in the tax haven deposit locations but excluding Luxembourg(Tax-Haven-DL is
mentioned as YES whereas Luxembourg-DL is mentioned as NO in the bottom). We control for
the country-pair time-invariant fixed effects and the deposit location-quarter year time fixed
effects. The standard errors are cluster robust with clustering at the residence country level.
The data set is divided into smaller subsets in scenarios 2, 3 and 4(the terms columns and
scenarios will be used interchangeably throughout the remainder of the section) as the
regression model that is run on the entire data set might not reveal an accurate picture.
When the model is run for the whole data set, we observe a coefficient of 0.152 on the
Dual_Citizenshipit variable, indicating that the deposit level for residence countries
having dual citizenship is in general 15.2%(significant in the 99% confidence interval)
more than for residence countries not having dual citizenship. The coefficient indicates a
percentage change because we have taken the log(Deposits) as the dependant variable.
However, it has to be borne in mind that most countries with dual citizenship are the
west’s developed economies, which are also important centres for financial and commercial
38 5.2 Regression evidence & analysis
activity. The higher level of deposits could be due to this inherent bias in the treatment
and the control group. To check this, we divide the data set into two groups, the deposits
held by residence countries in tax havens and non-tax havens, respectively. The reason for
dividing the data set into the groups mentioned above is that individuals or companies
generally pursue tax havens to reduce their tax liability (Picciotto, 1992). This reduction
in tax liability could either be in the form of tax evasion or avoidance and broadly comes
under the purview of regulatory arbitrage (Ahrens et al., 2020).
When the model is run on the data set of deposits of residence countries in tax haven
locations only, we observe a coefficient of 0.455 on the Dual_Citizenshipit variable,
indicating that the deposit level for residence countries having dual citizenship is in
general 45.5%(99% confidence interval) more than for residence countries not having dual
citizenship. For the deposits of residence countries in non-tax haven locations, we observe
that the deposit level for countries with dual citizenship is only 6.12%(99% confidence
interval) than the countries without dual citizenship. Usually, suppose dual citizenship
does not have any effect. In that case, the difference in the level of deposits in a tax
haven and non-tax haven deposit locations should be the same for both countries having
and not having dual citizenship. This abnormal difference in the deposit levels in a tax
haven and non-tax haven gives us the first evidence that dual citizenship might be an
effective method to avoid or evade taxes. However, caution has to be observed here as the
tax haven deposit locations include Luxembourg. As previously mentioned in section 4.1,
Luxembourg is a financial powerhouse and home to a huge investment fund. Therefore,
excluding Luxembourg from the list of tax havens might give a better estimate about
dual citizenship being used for tax evasion or avoidance by individual high net-worth
individuals or shell companies.
When we exclude Luxembourg from the list of tax havens and run the model, we observe
that the coefficient on the Dual_Citizenshipit variable reduces considerably from 0.455
to 0.189, indicating that the deposit level for residence countries having dual citizenship is
in general 18.9% more than for residence countries not having dual citizenship. Excluding
Luxembourg from the list reduces the difference between the treatment and the control
group, adding weight to the assumption made about Luxembourg. However, we still have
a more significant value than the difference between the treatment and control group for
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non-tax haven deposit locations, strengthening the argument that dual citizenship might
be used as a method of regulatory arbitrage.
5.2.2 Effect of dual citizenship on cross-border deposits post-
DAC6
The results from the DiD regression design model in 4.2 is presented in Table 5.3 below.
Table 5.2: Effect of dual citizenship on deposits post-DAC6
(1) (2) (3) (4)








Dual_Citizenship 0.115*** 0.394*** 0.0332 0.117***
(0.0239) (0.0357) (0.0267) (0.0357)
DAC_6_Initiated*
Dual_Citizenship
0.0551* 0.0904* 0.0419 0.107**
(0.0303) (0.0472) (0.0349) (0.0507)
Observations 81,207 21,350 59,857 17,626
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.967
Country-pair FE YES YES YES YES
Deposit-time FE YES YES YES YES
Tax-Haven-DL YES NO YES
Luxembourg-DL NO
Robust standard error in parantheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Notes: The columns numbered (1)-(4) in the table represent the findings under different data
sets. The first column is for the entire data set. The second column is for the data set containing
the deposits in the tax haven deposit locations. The third column is for the deposits held in
non-tax haven deposit locations. The final column is for the deposits held in the tax haven
deposit locations but excluding Luxembourg. We control for the country-pair time-invariant
fixed effects and the deposit location-quarter year time fixed effects. The standard errors are
cluster robust with clustering at the residence country level.
For the first scenario of the model, we observe that the coefficient on the standalone
effect of Dual_Citizenshipit, β1, on the deposit level is 0.115. This indicates that, in
general, countries having dual citizenship have a deposit level of 11.5%(99% confidence
interval) more than countries not having dual citizenship by having dual citizenship.
The DiD interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗Dual_Citizenshipit gives the effect of
dual citizenship post-DAC6. From the coefficient of the interaction term, β2, in the first
column, we can infer that post-DAC 6, the growth in deposit levels for countries with
dual citizenship was 5.51%(90% confidence interval) more than the growth in deposit
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levels for countries not having dual citizenship. This indicates that post-DAC 6 also, dual
citizenship is still effective as a method of regulatory arbitrage.
However, as explained in the previous model, the list of dual citizenship countries includes
most of the developed economies of the west that are prominent centres for business
activity. Therefore, similar to the previous model, we also run the model for the deposits
held by countries in tax havens and non-tax havens separately. In column 2, for the
deposits held by countries in tax havens, we observe that the standalone coefficient β1
significantly increases to 39.4%. The coefficient of the interaction term, β2, also shows an
increase to 9.04%(90% confidence interval) now from 5.51% observed for the first scenario
indicating that post-DAC 6, the effect of dual citizenship is more robust in the tax haven
locations suggesting the possible use of dual citizenship. For non-tax havens, we observe
that β1 reduces drastically to 3.32%(not statistically significant), and β2 also marginally
reduces to 4.19%(statistically not significant).
For the last scenario, as done in the previous model, we exclude Luxembourg from the list
of tax havens because Luxembourg is a significant tax haven for multinational corporations
and because Luxembourg is the only tax haven that is directly affected by the DAC6 as
it is an EU country. When the model is run by excluding Luxembourg, we see that β1
reduces drastically to 11.7%(99% confidence interval) from 39.4% observed in scenario
2. However, the interaction term yields a more substantial result of 10.7% now from
the 9.04% reported in scenario 2. The result is also statistically significant, indicating
that the tax havens situated outside the EU are now more lucrative for the residents of
countries with dual citizenship. This finding adds more credence to the argument that
dual citizenship might be an effective method of regulatory arbitrage post-DAC6.
5.2.3 Effect of DAC6 on cross-border deposits of EU countries
The results from the DiD regression model described in equation 4.3 is presented in Table
5.4. The purpose of this model is different from all the other models. Whereas all the
other models were built to check if dual citizenship can be used as an effective method of
regulatory arbitrage, this model was constructed to analyse whether DAC 6 has effectively
reported cross-border deposits DAC6 is meant explicitly for countries belonging to the
EU.
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The first four data sets in this model are similar to the last two models. As a measure
of further analysis, we run the model for the deposits held in Luxembourg exclusively
in the previous scenario. In all the columns, we can observe that the standalone effect
of EU countries, in general, does not exist as the coefficient, β1 is eliminated due to
multicollinearity. However, in column (1), where the study is performed over the entire
data set, the coefficient for the interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ EU_Countryit,
β2, is observed to have a value of 0.103 indicating that the growth of deposits from EU
residence countries is 10.3% more than the growth of deposits from non-EU residence
countries post-DAC 6(99% confidence interval). From the first scenario, we can observe a
strong correlation between the introduction of DAC6 and the growth of deposits from EU
countries, indicating that DAC6 might have impacted the reporting of deposits. Given
that DAC6 was the only policy shock that had been introduced in that given period, it is
highly probable that the DAC 6 was, in fact, successful in ensuring a strict reporting of
cross-border deposits and closing the gaps that existed in AEOI, if any.
In column (2), when we only consider the deposits held by countries in tax havens, we
observe that the coefficient β2 yield a much higher value of 0.231 or 23.1%(significant
in the 99% confidence interval). The higher level of deposits from EU countries post
DAC6 can be primarily attributed to DAC6. This shows that DAC 6 has been effective
in ensuring that the deposits held by EU residents in any location in the world will now
have to be reported strictly. The directives under DAC6 that the intermediaries, be
it banks or other financial institutions, have to report the various schemes suggested
by them to their customers irrespective of where the investments are made. In column
(3), when we consider the deposits held in non-tax haven locations, we observe that the
coefficient shows a marginal increase of only 6%(statistically not significant) post-DAC6.
Generally, the deposits held in non-tax havens are considered to be held for trade or
business, and there is no incentive for tax evaders or avoiders to invest in non-tax havens.
However, Picciotto (1992) says that any country might be a haven in relation to another
by definition. However, the description is rhetorical, and for this study, we stick to the six
deposit locations considered by Casi et al. (2020b) in their research.
When we remove Luxembourg from the list of tax havens and run the model in column (4),
we observe that the coefficient significantly reduces from 23.1% previously to 12.1%(90%
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confidence interval) now. This result, however, signifies that the effect of DAC6 is not the
same on all tax-havens. Excluding the lone tax haven in the EU makes a considerable
change in the coefficient, both numerically and statistically, implying that the correlation
between DAC6 and the successful reporting of deposits from tax havens is weak compared
to the complete set of tax havens. The EU should be more cautious and ensure that
the deposits held in tax havens outside the EU are tracked meticulously to ensure better
DAC6. Finally, when we run the model for only the deposits held in Luxembourg, we
see a robust coefficient of 78.6%(99% confidence interval), indicating that the growth of
deposits from EU residence countries post-DAC6 has been 78.6% more than the growth of
deposits from non-EU countries. It cannot be possible that the coefficient is due to more
deposits being made. Still, there is a strong possibility that since Luxembourg is directly
affected by DAC6, there is stricter adherence to the guidelines under DAC6, ensuring strict
reporting compliance. The coefficient term indicates high levels of correlation between
DAC6 and strict reporting from all EU countries, indicating that DAC6 might be very
effective in aiding AEOI.
5.2.4 Effect of CBI programs on cross-border deposits post-
DAC6
This section analyses the results from the DiD regression design models given in equations
4.4 and 4.5, which are presented in Table 5.5. It has to be noted here that countries that
offer CBI programs qualify under the list of countries providing dual citizenship. However,
the countries that offer such programs are generally tiny, except Turkey, and none has
any significant economic value. However, these schemes appear to strongly correlate with
tax evasion, as evidenced by Langenmayr and Zyska (2021). The first four columns in
Table 5.5 pertain to the effect of CBI programs in general post-DAC6. We only break
the CBI countries into aggressive CBI countries and non-aggressive CBI countries in
the last four columns. The countries considered aggressive CBI countries are Cyprus,
Dominica, Grenada, Malta, St. Lucia, Vanuatu and Panama. In these countries, the
first six countries are also considered by Langenmayr and Zyska (2021)in their study as
high-risk CBI programs.
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However, as per the list compiled by Christians (2017), Panama is also a country that
offers many CBI programs that are very similar to those provided by the other high-
risk CBI countries(OECD, 2018). Therefore, we also consider Panama as an aggressive
CBI country for this study. In the first four columns, when we consider all the CBI
countries, we can observe that the standalone coefficient of CBI_Country_RCit, β1,
is present. In column (1), when we consider the entire data set, β1 has a minimal
value of 0.4%(not statistically significant). However, the coefficient of the interaction
term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ CBI_Country_RCit, β2 has a value of 0.265 or 26.5%(99%
confidence interval), indicating that the CBI programs were in high demand post-DAC6.
Since DAC6 affects only the EU countries, an investor who does not have the citizenship
of any EU country would not be especially inclined towards these programs post-DAC6.
However, there is an incentive for investors from the EU who would desire more secrecy
to choose these programs post-DAC6. As mentioned earlier, since CBI countries are a
subset of the countries having dual citizenship, there is a strong correlation observed here
between the introduction of DAC6 and the increasing popularity of the CBI programs.
Another observation here is that CBI programs are specifically designed for individual
investors and not for companies. Therefore, they are more prone to be used by tax evaders
to avoid disclosure.
In column(2), when we run the model only for tax haven deposit locations, we observe
that the standalone coefficient β1 tends to increase significantly from 0.4% to 16.6%(99%
confidence interval), suggesting that the deposits from CBI countries in tax havens are
generally more than that of non-CBI countries, which is on expected lines. However,
the coefficient of the interaction term β2 reduces considerably from 26.5% to 17.2%(95%
confidence interval). This result is also puzzling. We have previously observed that
post-DAC6, the deposit levels in tax havens of countries having dual citizenship was much
more than in the entire set of deposit locations. For the deposits held in non-tax havens
in column (3), we observe that β2 has a value of 30.4%(99% confidence interval) while β1
has a value of -5.28%(not statistically significant). This result shows that though residents
of CBI countries primarily avoided non-tax haven deposit locations, post-DAC6, there is
a strong affinity for these deposit locations. The only possible explanation for this could
be that the non-tax haven deposit locations are being used as a transitory option by the
residents of CBI countries till they can sort out alternative methods of routing the money
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back into tax havens.
As a final measure of the analysis for CBI countries, we exclude Luxembourg from the
list of tax havens and rerun the model. Now, we observe that β1 increases from 16.6% in
column (2) to 36.8%(99% confidence interval). The coefficient β2 also increases significantly
from 17.2% to 27.6%(99% confidence interval) now. This is in line with the assumption
that Luxembourg was more of a tax haven for multinational corporations and lesser for
individuals. It also reinforces the previous argument that Luxembourg would largely be
avoided as it is the only tax haven directly affected by the DAC6. The exclusion also brings
the β2 value for scenarios (1), (3) and (4) relatively close, suggesting that residents from
CBI countries have been indifferent between tax havens and non-tax havens post-DAC6,
which suggests that CBI programs are also heavily used as methods of regulatory arbitrage
post-DAC6.
In columns (5)-(8), we run the DiD regression design model given in equation 4.5. In
these scenarios, the treatment group consists of only the aggressive CBI countries. The
control group of countries that have been used in columns (1)-(4) will also be used here.
However, the treatment group includes only the deposits of seven countries now, and
three countries, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, which are not categorised as high-risk
CBI programs, are dropped from the treatment group. The purpose behind this model
is to evaluate if the high-risk CBI program has a much significant effect on the deposits
post-DAC6 than the entire set of CBI countries taken together. From the results, we can
witness that the standalone coefficient of Aggressive_CBI_Countries_RCit, β3, is not
present due to multicollinearity. However, when we take the coefficients on the interaction
term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗Aggressive_CBI_Countries_RCit, β4, we observe that the
value of the coefficient is almost equal to the coefficient β2 in columns (1)-(4). The only
difference is that the coefficients on columns(6) and (8) are statistically less significant than
their counterparts in columns (2) and (4). Apart from that, we do not see a substantial
change in the coefficient values, suggesting that there is, in fact, no significant difference
between high-risk CBI programs and other CBI programs. The idea that high-risk CBI
programs will only be used for tax evasion is not evidenced here.
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5.2.5 Effect of DAC6 on cross-border deposits in EU deposit
locations
The results from the DiD regression model in equation 4.6 are given in Table 5.6. This
model is unique because, in all the other models, we have measured how the deposits of
residence countries, having specific characteristics, changed post-DAC6. In this model,
however, we observe how the deposits have changed in EU deposit locations post-DAC6.
The model is run over 11 different data sets.
For all the columns in the list, we can observe no value presented for the standalone
coefficient of EU_Country_DLjt, β1, due to multicollinearity. However, the coefficient
on the interaction term DAC_6_Initiatedt ∗ EU_Country_DLjt, β2, is presented. In
column (1), when we consider the entire set of countries, we can observe that the value of
β2 is almost close to zero at -0.8%(not statistically significant). When we break down the
data set into countries with dual citizenship in column (2), we observe that the value of
β2 changes from -0.8% to -1.12% now. However, it is still a minimal change and is not
statistically significant. In column (3), where we consider the set of countries not having
dual citizenship, the value of β2 is similar to the first scenario and is not statistically
significant. However, when we break down the data set further based on whether the
country is an EU country or not, we start observing that the value of β2 starts to change.
In column (4), where we consider the set of EU countries having dual citizenship, we see
that β2 has a value of 20.8%(99% confidence interval). Previously, in scenario (2), we have
seen no effect on the EU deposit location post-DAC6 for countries with dual citizenship.
However, now we cannot say the same. For EU countries not having dual citizenship, we
find that the value of β2 to be 14.7%(column (5)). However, the value is not statistically
significant.
When we check the model for non-EU countries having dual citizenship, we observe
that the value of β2 is now -8.58%(95% confidence interval). This finding indicates that
the residents of non-EU countries with dual citizenship avoid the EU deposit locations
post-DAC6 for two reasons. One might be the higher cost of reporting post-DAC6, making
EU deposit locations less lucrative. The other possibility could be that the citizens of
EU countries who also have citizenship of a non-EU country might avoid depositing in
EU deposit locations due to a higher threat of detection. For the time being, let us
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assume that the higher cost of reporting is the prime reason non-EU citizens avoid EU
deposit locations. In that case, we should see a similar result for the non-EU countries
without dual citizenship in column (7). However, we find the value of β2 only to be -1.35%
for column (7), and the value is not statistically significant. Therefore, the higher cost
of reporting compliance can be ruled out as we do not see a similar effect on non-EU
countries not having dual citizenship strengthening the argument that dual citizenship
can be used to avoid being detected. The finding allows us to infer that dual citizenship
can be used as a method of regulatory arbitrage.
Since the set of countries with dual citizenship also includes countries offering CBI
programs, we rerun the model by breaking down the data set into dual citizenship
countries offering CBI programs and dual citizenship countries not offering CBI programs.
The reason for doing this is that we have already observed from Table 5.5 that CBI schemes
had a significant effect post-DAC 6. So, it could also be the case that most of the negative
growth in EU deposit locations for non-EU countries was coming from the countries
offering CBI programs. To ascertain whether dual citizenship also has a role in the
reduction in the deposits we run the model for scenarios (8)-(11).For countries belonging
to the EU and offering CBI(column (8)), we find the value of β2 to be -10.1%(statistically
not significant). For non-EU countries offering CBI(column (9)), we find the value of
β2 to be -26.3%(statistically not significant). When we consider the set of EU countries
having dual citizenship but not CBI, we find the value of β2 to be 23.5%(99% confidence
interval). Previously for EU countries having dual citizenship, we observed the value to be
20.8%. Therefore, though the value of β2 is not statistically significant in column (8), we
can observe that from countries offering CBI programs, investing in EU deposit locations
has reduced post-DAC6. Finally, when we run the model for non-EU countries having
dual citizenship but not CBI, we observe that the value of β2 is -6.96%(90% confidence
interval). We see a reduction in the value and statistical significance after excluding
the CBI countries, but the value is still more than that for countries not having dual
citizenship.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The findings in the previous section show that there is a correlation between dual citizenship
and the deposit levels of countries post-DAC6, suggesting possible causality of dual
citizenship as a method of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6. However, care has to be
taken while inferring strict causality as the study is not without its limitations. In the
following subsection 6.1, we discuss the limitations of the research and how they can affect
the study results. In subsection 6.2, we discuss how dual citizenship can affect countries
by studying the case of Norway, the latest country to allow dual citizenship.
6.1 Limitations of study
This study tries to assess the impact of dual citizenship as a method of regulatory arbitrage
against DAC6 with the help of five regression models. Each of the models controls for
the time-invariant country-pair fixed effects. In the first four models, we control for the
deposit-location quarter-year time fixed effects, and in the last model, we control for
the residence-country quarter-year time fixed effects. We do not control for any other
factors explicitly in the models. However, there might be instances where the country-pair
time-invariant characteristics between countries can change. The possibility that volatility
in certain key areas can cause an omitted-variable bias (Wooldridge, 2019) in the results
is acknowledged. However, owing to the short period of only 19 quarters in the study, we
assume that the time-invariant and time-variant fixed effects cover most of the factors to
be controlled for similar to the study by Casi et al. (2020b). An example of the factors that
can be controlled explicitly for the study includes economic characteristics of countries like
GDP and GDP per capita (Langenmayr and Zyska, 2021), country characteristics such as
capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006) and banking crisis (Laeven and Valencia,
2018) in the period of study. Other important factors that can affect the cross-border
deposits also include political system stability and corruption (Andersen et al., 2017),
armed conflicts and natural disasters (Andersen et al., 2020) and also exchange rate
fluctuations (Andersen et al., 2017). Controlling for all additional factors might help
eliminate any existing bias in the study.
The lack of data on the number of citizens holding dual citizenship in countries is one of
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the possible limitations of this study. As explained in the section on data description, some
countries that offer dual citizenship only provide it under restricted conditions. Under
these restrictions, since the number of citizens having dual citizenship might be few, it
can be argued that considering the deposits of such countries might cause a positive bias
in the results. However, there are three reasons why countries that offer dual citizenship
under restrictions are also considered under the list of countries providing dual citizenship:
1. No source can give a complete list of citizens from each country that have dual
citizenship.
2. It has to be noted that the assumption is that aggressive tax planning is pursued
mainly by high net worth individuals. Even if a country has very few people who
have dual citizenship, there is a high possibility that these people might be the high
net worth individuals of that country. Therefore, adding such countries to the list is
assumed not to cause any bias in the results.
3. From the list of dual citizenship provided in the appendix, it can be observed that
most of the developed economies do not pose any restrictions on dual citizenship,
barring a few countries such as Germany, Austria and South Korea, which makes it
intuitively sound to add all the countries that offer dual citizenship with or without
restrictions to the treatment group.
As mentioned in the data description section, a final possible limitation is the use of
cross-border deposits as a method of assessing tax evasion or avoidance. Apart from the
limitations of the data mentioned previously, it has to be observed that the deposits in
only 31 countries are reported in the database. The cross-border deposits held in some
major economies like China, India, Russia etc., is not present in the database. Therefore,
including the cross-border deposits from these nations might cause the results to change.
Also, in the current study, we only study the movement of cross-border deposits. However,
many more instruments qualify under cross-border arrangements that are not recorded in
the database. The source for other cross-border investments is the IMF’s Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) (IMF, 2021). The use of CPIS is especially limited
as there is no segregation of data and the numbers presented in the database include
investments by individuals, companies and banks. There is a high possibility that the
investments from banks could be more significant in some cases, causing an inherent bias
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in the results (Cobham and Jansky, 2018). Therefore, this study is performed on the
more widely used data of cross-border deposits.
6.2 The case of Norway
Norway is the latest country to introduce dual citizenship. Norway introduced dual
citizenship with effect from 1st January 2020 (Utlendingsdirektoratet, 2020). Norway is
a relatively small but wealthy country in the world with a projected GDP per capita
of $81,995 for the year 2021 as reported by the International Monetary Fund’s World
Economic Outlook database. The population of Norway at the end of the fourth quarter
of 2020 was 5,391,369 (Statistics Norway, 2021). As per a report by Forbes (Nikel, 2020),
Norway had received 26,000 applications for dual citizenship in few months. The number
of applications is equal to approximately 0.5% of Norway’s population. Given that these
are the number of applications received in the first few months, many more people might
apply for Norwegian citizenship in the months to come. Though Norway was planning to
introduce Mandatory Disclosure Requirements(hereafter called MDR) similar to DAC6
and a proposal to that effect was also introduced on 27th June 2019, no formal law
regarding the MDR has been introduced (Brown Brothers Harriman, 2020; KPMG, 2019).
In light of the significant number of applications received by Norway regarding dual
citizenship, adequate requirements should be taken. Økokrim, Norway’s state economic
crime unit, has mentioned tax evasion as one of the biggest threats to the welfare state
(Berglund, 2018). Given the findings of this study that dual citizenship can be used
as one of the methods of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6, care should be taken by
Norway in minimizing the loss in tax revenue due to aggressive tax planning activities.
It can be suggested that clauses regarding disclosure be made more stringent for the
applicants of dual citizenship when MDR is officially introduced in Norway. It is also
suggested that MDR should be introduced at the earliest and stringent laws for mandatory
disclosure for all dual citizens should be put in place to ensure minimization of aggressive
tax planning. Moreover, the findings in the study suggest a strong preference for CBI
programs post-DAC6. Therefore, the tax authorities must ensure that CBI programs are
not used by Norwegians for aggressive tax planning in the guise of dual citizenship.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis aims to verify if dual citizenship can be used as a method of regulatory
arbitrage against DAC6. The thesis analyses panel data of cross-border deposits from
Q1 2016 till Q3 2020 by controlling for fixed effects and using difference-in-difference
models. A small period of 19 quarters post introduction of CRS is chosen to ensure that
multiple policy shocks are not present within the same period. Similar to the study by
Casi et al. (2020b), we implement a strong fixed effects structure to control for deposit
location-specific shocks to the cross-border deposits in models that test the change in
deposits over time for residence countries. In the model that tests the change of deposit
levels in deposit locations, we control residence country-specific shocks that could impact
the cross-border deposits.
The findings from the models indicate that post-DAC6 deposits of residents of countries
that have dual citizenship showed higher growth in tax havens than countries not having
dual citizenship. The growth of deposits from countries having dual citizenship was found
to be stronger and more significant when Luxembourg, which is generally considered to
be a tax haven for MNCs, was dropped from the list of tax havens. Also, it was evidenced
that the deposits of residents of non-EU countries having dual citizenship were growing
much slower in EU deposit locations in comparison to non-EU countries not having dual
citizenship post-DAC6. Both the previous findings show that dual citizenship can be used
as a method of regulatory arbitrage against DAC6. DAC6 was found to be more effective
in disclosing deposits as the reported deposits from EU countries post-DAC6 showed much
more substantial growth than non-EU countries. Finally, the study also found that the
affinity for CBI programs was high post introduction of DAC6, with the deposits from
these countries showing a very strong growth post-DAC6, indicating that such schemes
could also be used as a method of regulatory arbitrage.
The study adds to the existing literature of legal and normative studies on DAC6 by
providing an empirical angle on the movement of deposits post-DAC6. The study also
adds to the current literature of empirical studies on the methods of regulatory arbitrage
used against instruments devised to curb aggressive tax planning such as CRS and DAC6.
However, the most significant contribution of this study is that it tries to study dual
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citizenship from an angle of regulatory arbitrage and tax sovereignty. The study can serve
as a base for policymaking in the future to ensure that tax loss due to aggressive tax
planning by using dual citizenship is minimized, given that more countries continue to
introduce dual citizenship over time.
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A1 List of countries offering dual citizenship
The following countries are listed as countries offering dual citizenship on the website of
Arton Capital (Arton Capital, 2021), a consultancy that assists people in obtaining dual
citizenship. However, the website does not provide the details of the restrictions about
the same. The details of the restrictions have been researched on various other websites.
Therefore, in the following table, the details of the restrictions on dual citizenship and the
source of information are provided.
Table A1.1: List of countries offering dual citizenship








Child born abroad of Angolan
parents, who obtains the
nationality of the country of birth,
may retain dual citizenship until
reaching the age of 18, when one




Two groups are recognized as
dual citizens. The first are children
(18 and under), born abroad, who
acquire citizenship of birth country.
Upon reaching maturity at age
18, however, a declaration of
allegiance must be made to one
country. Citizens of Spain and
Italy can hold dual citizenship
per agreement with Argentina.
(Habib, 2016)
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Table A1.1 – continued from previous page








Persons obtaining two citizenships
at birth.
The restention of the second
citizenship is in the interest





Government can grant citizenship
to any person who is a citizen of
Europe or North America or of any
state which the government may ,
by notification in the official




















Dual citizenship allowed only
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Table A1.1 – continued from previous page
Country Details of Restriction Source
Bulgaria
Dual citizenship is allowed for
spouses of bulgarian citizens,
citizens of a member state of EU,
country party to EEA or from
Switzerland, and countries that







Article 21: Any Burundian, to
whom the law confers this status
as a native, is entitled to have
dual nationality.
Article 22: Any person having
held Burundian nationality as a
native and having lost it by
acquiring a foreign nationality
may regain Burundian
nationality, on condition of
applying for it, and keep his
or her second nationality.
Article 23: An adopted child can,
on reaching the age of majority,
apply to recover Burundian
nationality without losing the
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Citizens of all countries except






Child born abroad, who obtains
the citizenship of the country of
birth may retain dual citizenship
until their 21st birthday. Person
then has 12 months to renounce
foreign citizenship or Congolese
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The Egyptian law allows Egyptian
citizens to naturalize a foreign
nationality while retaining the
Egyptian citizenship after
obtaining the permission of the




Salvadorans by birth have the
right to enjoy double or multiple
citizenship. This right is not
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Germany
As a rule, children born to a
German and a non-German
parent, or to parents with dual
nationality, acquire the
nationalities of both parents at
birth, according to the principle
of descent.
Ethnic German repatriates and
family members admitted with
them acquire German citizenship
when they are issued a repatriates
certificate, in accordance with
Section 7 of the Nationality Act;
they do not have to give up their
previous citizenship. If allowed by
their countries of origin, their
children born in Germany then
acquire at birth both German
citizenship and that of their
parents.
In certain cases, German citizens
may apply for dual nationality,
allowing them to acquire foreign
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Guatemala
Guatemala maintains dual
citizenship agreements with some
countries of Central and South





Only with countries that Hondura













Child born to married parents of
different nationalities, one being
Icelandic and the other a foreigner.
A naturalized person is not
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Jordan
The laws of Jordan provide for
the acquisition of Jordanian
citizenship at birth to any child
whose father is a Jordanian
citizen. This is true regardless of
the place of birth, and of other









In case the obtainment of the
citizenship of the other state is
not in contradiction with Kyrgyz
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Latvia
Citizenship of another EU Member
State or another EFTA Member
State;
Citizenship of another NATO
Member State;
Citizenship of Australia, Brazil
or New Zealand;
Citizenship of such a country with
which Latvia has concluded an
agreement on the recognition of
dual citizenship (no such agreement
is currently concluded);
Citizenship of a country not referred
to previously if due to important
national interests permission from
the Cabinet is received to retain
dual citizenship;
Citizenship of a country not
referred to previously if it has
been acquired automatically
(ex lege) through marriage or
as a result of adoption.Children
of citizens of Latvia may hold






Continued on next page
A1 List of countries offering dual citizenship 71
Table A1.1 – continued from previous page
Country Details of Restriction Source
Lithuania
A person who has acquired the
citizenship of another country by
birth or adoption (upto 21 years).
Through marriage to a citizen of
another state.
A person who fled Lithuania
before 11th March, 1990 and








Dual citizenship is not recognized
for Chinese nationals. Allowed
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Mexico
Mexican law establishes a
distinction between nationality
and citizenship. The 1998
Amendment recognized Mexican
nationality transmitted by birth,
restricting nationality to the
first generation born abroad.
It also preserved Mexican
nationality by birth, when adopting
a foreign nationality. Mexicans
abroad holding Mexican nationality
will be treated with legal equality in
Mexico; specifically, they will keep
patrimonial rights, access to reserved
areas of investment, and the ability







Dual citizenship is permitted to
citizens who held dual citizenship
before Montenegro declared
independence on 3rd June, 2006.
Also people who obtain dual








Nauruan woman who receives a
second citizenship upon her marriage
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Countries of Central America and
other countries with which
Nicaragua has agreements of dual
citizenship. No agreement exists


















Dual citizenship only allowed
for nationals of : United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Belgium, Iceland,









Only to citizens of Australia, Fiji,
Germany, New Zealand, Samoa,




Only citizens of Spain and Italy
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Person born abroad of St. Vincentian
parents, who obtained citizenship
of the country of birth. Child
born in St. Vincent of foreign
parents. Citizen of St. Vincent






A person who involuntarily
acquires dual citizenship by
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Seychelles
The government of Seychelles
only recognizes dual citizenship
in specific cases concerning native
born citizens of Seychelles who
later obtain another citizenship
for domestic or economic
convenience (such as to work
abroad) or involuntarily through













Dual citizenship may be
permitted if a person marries a
Korwan citizen, a person has
greatly contributed to Korea,
has outstanding abilities or finds








Only allowed for citizens of
countries with historical links
with Spain. Also Spanish nationals
can acquire other citizenships
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Except that citizens of Taiwan
are not recognized as dual
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Vietnam has permitted dual
citizenship under limited
circumstances since July 1, 2009.
Certain foreigners and overseas
Vietnamese can apply for dual
citizenship. Those having
Vietnamese parents or children
or married to a Vietnamese spouse,
those who make special
contributions or benefit Vietnam









The data downloaded from the BIS-LBS database, the code used for cleaning and
organizing the data and the regression codes for the models described in the thesis
will be provided on request. For access to the data please mail the author at
rohitreddy.muddasani@gmail.com.
